We study the use of inventory when a distributor is better informed about demand than a manufacturer. We …nd that when distributor and manufacturer values are interdependent it is optimal to endow the distributor with some inventory before it obtains its private information. We characterize the …nal allocation of the good and show that the distributor may have too few (many) units relative to the e¢ cient allocation when demand is high (low).
Introduction
The predominant vehicle for manufacturing and selling commodities is the supply or distribution agreement. Examples of these vertical relationships include supply channel relationships, franchise agreements, and leasing and option contracts. What nearly all of these arrangements have in common is that decisions regarding the sale and distribution of the commodity or service are delegated to the better equipped and informed party, the retailer in the case of supply channel relationships or the franchisee in the case of franchise agreements.
Economists have devoted considerable attention to understanding the rationale for various supply contracts and organizations.
1 Agency theory suggests that the standard supply contract clauses we observe, such as franchise fees, inventory adjustment provisions, and vertical restraints are put in place to align the parties incentives and discourage opportunistic behavior. We focus on an adverse selection problem with interdependent values: the market value of product for the manufacturer and the distributor (retailer) is positively correlated.
In this setting, the opportunistic behavior that needs to be discouraged is the misreporting of market demand by the distributor to obtain inventories on better terms. 2 The literature has also examined moral hazard problems, including provision of incentives for the retailer to expend su¢ cient e¤ort to gather information on local markets and to establish a distribution network and provide customer services (see, for example, Mathewson and Winter (1984) ).
A wide variety of inventory supply arrangements are employed in retail distribution channels. At one extreme are "just in time" agreements where the retailer holds no initial stocks but acquires inventory from the manufacturer as it is needed. This places most of the risk on the manufacturer to absorb unforeseen variations in retail demand. At the other extreme are "outright purchase" agreements whereby the distributor makes a one time purchase of inventory which cannot be returned to the manufacturer, unless it is damaged.
In between these two extremes are a multitude of "quantity ‡exible" agreements that allow actual supply deliveries to vary by some amount around the distributor's forecasted demand for inventory. Such arrangements, which also include "take or pay" contracts (a buyer payment is required independent of delivery), spread the risk of demand uncertainty more evenly between the manufacturer and distributor.
We analyze an agency model of retail distribution to explain the occurrence of inventory supply provisions in resolving adverse selection problems. In particular, we examine settings where a manufacturer and distributor's valuations for goods are positively correlated, and the distributor eventually has private information about both …rms'valuations. We have two main …ndings. First, if the value of goods for the manufacturer vary su¢ ciently little with the distributor's private information, then any assignment of inventory prior to when the distributor obtains private information is optimal. On the other hand, if the manufacturer's valuations for the good do vary with the private information, then a distributor should be allocated a unique positive amount of inventory before he learns about demand. We characterize the optimal allocation of the good once demand is realized. For an interior set of demand realizations, there is no adjustment in inventory, and for a unique demand realization goods are optimally allocated. Relative to the …rst-best allocation, for low realizations of demand the distributor has too many goods, while for high realizations of demand the distributor has too few goods. In e¤ect, the distributor is allocated a positive inventory to create countervailing incentives (e.g., Lewis and Sappington (1989) ). When endowed with a positive stock, the incentive of the distributor to claim a low value when the value is high is muted since the manufacturer can agree to repurchase the initial stock at a low price thus denying the distributor of pro…ts from resale.
In section 2, we describe the model and establish basic properties of incentive mechanisms.
The optimal contract under private information is characterized in section 3. We provide conclusions in section 4.
Model and Basic Properties
A risk neutral manufacturer, denoted by M; has a stock Q > 0 of a commodity to allocate to di¤erent users. M can allocate part of his inventory q 2 [0; Q] to a risk neutral retail distributor D to sell. The remaining inventory, Q q is employed by the manufacturer for self production or direct sales. The net revenues earned by the distributor and by the manufacturer, respectively, from this inventory allocation are
We assume the gross revenue functions R i ( ), for i = D; M; are increasing and concave functions of sales. The gross revenues are each weighted by a demand e¤ect i ( ) which indicates the value of sales for the distributor and manufacturer, as a function of the parameter which re ‡ects demand conditions in the market. The stochastic component of demand is distributed as F ( ) with strictly positive density f ( ) for 2 ; with > 0: We assume, for analytical convenience, that the inverse hazard rates going forwards and backwards are
The demand e¤ect parameters for the distributor and the manufacturer are given by
As demand, , increases both direct (via M) and indirect (via D) sales revenues increase.
Direct sales rise at a slower rate to re ‡ect that they are less sensitive to variations in market conditions. A special case arises when M = 0 so that the value of inventory for self production is …xed and distributor demand then varies independently. Otherwise, when M > 0, direct and indirect revenues are interdependent so that high demand for distribution sales signals high demand for manufacturer sales as well.
A distribution mechanism for revealing demand information
M and D initially share the same ex ante information about market conditions. Since D specializes in the sale and promotion of manufactured goods, he eventually observes demand as characterized by : M wishes to design a distribution agreement that delegates to D the choice of allocating inventory between direct and indirect sales: D may then utilize his superior knowledge about demand to maximize total surplus, if the appropriate incentives can be provided. The mechanism allows the distributor to receive an initial allocation for its own sales; this may be adjusted once he observes .
Formally, we follow Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in modeling the distribution agreement as a mechanism that is designed to maximize expected sales revenue, subject to participation and incentive constraints. The agreement is governed by the menu, fq o ; 0 ; q ( ) ; ( )g which speci…es the following: This allows inventory to respond to changes in demand conditions. For example, if demand turns out to be high, D may apply for more inventory for an additional fee, whereas he may return some of his stock to the manufacturer for a credit when demand is low.
To be implementable, agreements must satisfy (i) D truthfully reports his information on demand and (ii) voluntary participation of M and D at all stages. We begin with (i).
The adjustments in inventory based on a report of 0 when true observed demand is will cause a change in (unweighted) revenues from indirect and direct sales as given by
The resulting pro…t for D from reporting 0 when is the true demand signal is denoted by
To implement the distribution agreement requires that it be incentive compatible, with
so that D is induced to truthfully report observed demand, . Note that the terms involving
The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) limits the allocations one can implement as described in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for (IC) are that for almost all (a) q ( ) is weakly increasing
The proofs of all formal results appear in the Appendix.
Condition (a) turns out to have particular importance in determining the sales allocations that can be implemented when D is privately informed. In equilibrium, D will be induced to acquire greater inventory the greater is distributor demand. This means that if D discovers demand is high, pretending that demand is low in order to reduce the wholesale payment to M will be costly for D since the additional inventory he receives will decrease when he understates demand. This restricts D 0 s ability to pro…t from private information.
In addition we require that the distribution agreement be interim individually rational 
We also require that the distribution agreement must be ex ante individually rational EIR D for D to participate before he learns about demand. This implies,
where
The following lemma provides necessary and su¢ cient conditions for satisfying (IC) ; IIR M ;
and IIR D :
and IIR D , if and only if
b 0 is a positive constant and sup f j q( ) < q 0 g and
The rationale of Lemma 2 is that the manufacturer will agree to the exchange only if he expects to break even. The compensation available to M consists of the total surplus minus 3 Set = if q( ) never falls below q 0 and set + = if q( ) never rises above q 0 :
Characterization of Optimal Agreements
In proceeding to solve the manufacturer's problem we …rst identify as a benchmark the social surplus maximizing arrangement (…rst best). Given our assumptions, the ex-post surplus maximizing inventory allotment denoted by q ( ) is unique and non-decreasing in with,
We say that q is essential if q ( ) is interior for all . This occurs for instance when the marginal revenues for direct and indirect sales are very large as sales go to zero.
The surplus maximizing agreement is characterized by the following:
Surplus Maximizing Agreement: The following agreement maximizes surplus for the manufacturer (a) q 0 = 0
Let a be the agreement de…ned by (a)-
This agreement is implemented by a two-part pricing arrangement. The arrangement involves a …xed fee equal to the expected pro…t D expects to earn from reallocating inventory once he learns demand. The initial inventory allocation may be set at zero (although any other initial allocation will su¢ ce). The subsequent adjustment in inventory corresponds with the optimal surplus maximizing inventory based on demand conditions. The payment made by D equals the increase in value of the additional inventory to distribution sales.
This arrangement is similar to the two-part pricing arrangements that monopoly sellers implement to capture the full surplus from consumers. Consumers are charged the marginal cost of service provision and a …xed fee equal to the consumer surplus they earn under e¢ cient marginal cost pricing.
When Can the First Best Be Implemented?
While the surplus maximizing agreement is clearly desirable, the settings in which it is possible to implement such agreements are limited. One such setting is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Suppose M is su¢ ciently small. Then the surplus maximizing allocation can be implemented with agreement a .
In settings where
M is small, an increase in demand increases the distributor's stock value without a¤ecting the manufacturer's value. The gains from adjusting inventories are large and su¢ cient in magnitude to …nance the rents which D earns from its private information about demand under these conditions. As a result, the ex-post participation of the manufacturer is unconstrained, thus allowing for a surplus maximizing allocation to be implemented by the two-part pricing agreement a :
In contrast, when M is large, an increase in demand increases both the manufacturer's and distributor's revenue valuation. The gains from trade are inherently reduced in this case.
A demand increase which causes D to demand more inventory also increases M 's value for inventory. This results in a 'lemons'exchange problem whereby the distributor only wishes to reduce his inventory holdings in the same states of the world where the manufacturer also wishes to reduce his holdings, thus decreasing the potential gains from trade. It may not be possible to implement the surplus maximizing allocation in this case, because the gains from exchange are insu¢ cient to cover D 0 s information rents. When this occurs M is unwilling to participate ex-post after D has observed demand, so that the adjustments that can be implemented are constrained and not surplus maximizing. In this instance, whatever surplus is generated by shifting sales to the more pro…table market segment is taxed away by the distributor as an information rent. Consequently, the manufacturer earns negative returns from participating in the agreement and would therefore be better o¤ selling his existing inventory. In this event, it is not possible to implement the surplus maximizing allocation with a distribution agreement. We now turn to this case to examine what agreements are possible in these settings.
The Lemon' s Problem and In ‡exible Agreements
When one cannot implement a due to a lemon's problem in exchange, inventories must be distorted from their optimal levels to constrain the rents of the distributor and allow the manufacturer to earn a break even return in the second phase of the agreement. The following proposition describes the type of agreements that are possible in this case.
Proposition 1 Suppose q is essential. Let > 0 be the multiplier corresponding to the
The optimal allocation exhibits these properties: (c) Partial adjustments in inventory are made when demand is su¢ ciently small or large, with
The solution is illustrated in Figure 1 . Property (a) addresses the crucial question of how to design the initial allocation to optimally distribute inventories. The initial allocation is always interior so the distributor is given some initial inventory. Subsequently, once D discovers the state of demand, he is allowed to make adjustments in his initial stock. When the inventory is more valuable on average for D, a larger initial share is allocated.
Interestingly, it is the relative expected demand between direct and indirect sales, not which party is better informed, that determines the initial inventory allocation between the parties.
Properties (b) and (c) describe how the …nal asset allocation di¤ers from q : When M 0 s compensation constraint is not binding, the …rst best allocation is implemented with q ( ) = q ( ) q 0 : The allocation begins with the optimal expected division, with D recommending adjustments from there to reach the e¢ cient division q ( ) once he learns :
When the …rst best is not implementable, it is because the inventory allocation is constrained to generate enough surplus to ensure participation of M . As illustrated in Figure   1 , properties (b) and (c) indicate that inventories are not adjusted for states close to D :
It is only for su¢ ciently di¤erent from D that inventory is adjusted in the direction of the e¢ cient levels. To understand this feature, consider the incentives for D to recommend inventory adjustments when is less than D : D is tempted to exaggerate demand to obtain a higher payment from M for returning some inventory. Therefore, reducing the amount of inventory that D may return to M when he claims a high value close to D will discourage D from overstating demand. When is greater than D , D has the opposite incentive and now understates demand to reduce the amount he must pay M to acquire more inventory.
In e¤ect, D 0 s ability to pro…t from private information about demand is limited by reducing the adjustments in inventory allocation he is allowed.
Conclusions
We presented a simple model of demand interdependencies in a bilateral relationship between a manufacturer and a distributor. We demonstrated that the allocation of inventory before demand is observed by the distributor is a useful device for creating countervailing incentives.
By endowing the distributor with a positive stock, he is discouraged from claiming a low value, when the value is high, for otherwise he will be required to sell the inventory back to the manufacturer at a price below the true value of the inventories. Regarding future work, the model potentially has broader applications including the dissolution of partnerships, the sale of real property, and the protection of intellectual property rights.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
(a) By (IC) we require that
Subtracting one condition from the other and rearranging implies,
Since R D is increasing this implies q ( ) must be weakly increasing.
(b) Since q ( ) is weakly increasing it is di¤erentiable almost everywhere. This implies that ( ) is di¤erentiable wherever q ( ) is. Hence the …rst order condition for truth telling may be written as
Totally di¤erentiating D ( j ) we …nd that the rate of increase in retailer rents is given by
Proof of Lemma 2
(a) IIR M requires that 
It follows upon integrating by parts that
So combining the above and noting that
; we obtain
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the …rst best, surplus maximizing program a as de…ned in the text. We show that (a), (b), and (c) from Lemma 2 hold as M goes to 0. Since q ( ) q 0 = 0, we can simplify the expression for M in Lemma 2 to obtain
Trivially, if q ( ) = 0 for all ; then M > 0 so that a can be implemented. More interesting is the case where q ( ) > 0 for some . Then integrating the above expression for M by parts, we have
as M ! 0: Since q ( ) > 0 holds, this last expression is strictly positive. Hence this demonstrates that M > 0 will hold once M falls below a threshold.
Proof of Proposition 1
To begin we shall assume the following condition (m) is satis…ed
Later we will verify that (m) is in fact satis…ed in the solution to [M ] Assuming an interior solution, pointwise maximization of [M ] with respect to q ( ) yields the following: If 2 [ ; )
and for 2 (
We note that for 2 [ ; )
which implies q 0 > q ( ) > q ( ). A similar argument applied to 2 ( + ; ] establishes that 
Let 0 = sup ( j q ( ) < q 0 ) where q ( ) is determined by the above pointwise condition:
Then it follows that Hence (m) must hold.
